Unpacking the Metro Line delay
Disappointing. Aggravating. Infuriating.
There are a lot of words I could use to describe the Metro LRT Line project thus far (many of which are not family friendly). Thankfully, today’s release of the City Auditor’s report on the project offers up some clear findings on how we got to where we are today: weeks away from interim operation that doesn’t yet come close to meeting our specifications.
The City Auditor has done exactly what Council tasked him to do. For context, he is fully independent of city staff and reports directly to Council; his work is one key way that Council holds administration to account when things go wrong.
Having reviewed the report, there are many details that I find troubling.
First of all, there is clear evidence of serious issues within the Transportation Department relating to roles, responsibilities and blurred lines of accountability and communication on this project. Not only were the city’s senior managers seemingly out of the loop when contractor performance started to slip in 2011, but City Council was left totally in the dark until late 2013 – which made it all the more difficult for us to hold staff accountable and explain to the public what was going on. For me, this is the most shocking finding and I suspect it will form the sharpest point of the arrow at Monday’s Audit Committee meeting.
In retrospect, the decision to split the signalling and civil construction contracts led to a lot of these internal communication and accountability problems. By dividing the project up, the City lost the ability to effectively coordinate construction activities, and it diminished our ability to hold the signal contractor accountable to timelines. While we are holding back roughly $26 million in payments from Thales, the total project value of $665 million is a much bigger stake and keeping them together would likely have increased the accountability between the consortium of contractors. Lesson learned.
It’s also clear in retrospect that the original target opening date of April 2014 was somewhat unrealistic. There was ample evidence that implementing signalling systems of this kind had proven difficult in other cities and very few transitions have gone smoothly. This wasn’t adequately accounted for in project timelines.
None of this, however, makes up for the fact that our signalling contractor – Thales – signed a contract committing to this timeline and has failed to deliver a large part of what was agreed to, time and time again. While they may claim the system is ready for full operation, the City and our expert consultants (Hatch Mott MacDonald, or HMM) have not received critical quality assurance paperwork that proves these claims are justified. During the project, when certain key documentation did arrive, it was frequently returned because it lacked necessary detail. As part of projects like this, we hire a third-party engineer like HMM to help validate the information we get back from our contractors and protect the City’s interest. As of June 15 of this year, only 1 of 6 major signalling sub-systems had been deemed suitable for revenue service by HMM.
It’s clear from reading this report that the City could have done a better job in managing its relationship with Thales, that the contract was not managed well by ETS, and that oversight from higher up in the Transportation Department was inadequate. For these reasons, coupled with the problems at Thales, the working relationship between the two organizations was characterized as frustrating and far from collaborative, which inevitably led to conflicting opinions on the state of deliverables.
One interesting finding from the report is that the City based the selection of Thales not on pricing but on ability to deliver the project within the specified time line. Many citizens have commented to the effect of ‘that’s what you get with the low bid’ – but that was not the case here. Thales was in fact the second highest bid, but one of the main reasons they won the job was the promise that they could deliver the project in 32 months. Sadly, we’re now in month 51 with a long time to go before the system is fully operational.
Even if the city had managed the contract perfectly, there’s now plenty of evidence in the auditor’s report to indicate that Thales would not have been able to deliver the promised product on time.
The Auditor makes three definitive recommendations, all of which are directed at the General Manager of the City’s Transportation Department, and all of which have been accepted by the Department:
- Follow consistent principles and methodologies of contract administration, including quality assurance and control
- Ensure roles, responsibilities, lines of communication, authority are clearly defined for all major projects
- Develop a standard reporting schedule for all major capital projects which includes schedule, scope and budget
City Council will hold both the City Manager and the General Manager of the Transportation Department accountable for meeting the action plans detailed in the report and ensuring these mistakes are never repeated. Changes have already been made, but more are needed, particularly around culture, and Council will be monitoring this very closely.
It’s important to note that the Valley LRT Line will be a P3 project, a model that bundles all the contracts together and transfers risk (and cost escalations) entirely to the private partner. Mercifully, the signal system for the Valley Line will not interact with either the Capital or Metro Line.
In my mind, this report will not slow or tarnish City Council’s pursuit of a full LRT network for Edmonton. LRT remains the most effective way to move large numbers of Edmontonians from A to B, increase our productivity by reducing commuting times, and free up our roadways for goods and services to move more easily. It is essential infrastructure for a growing city, a city that strives to be globally competitive in every sense. This includes how we effectively manage contracts to get good quality, cost-effective, on-time results in the future.
My only question is whether Thales will do their own internal audit. They’re in 50 countries and have done signalling 26 major cities including Hong Kong, London, New York, Vancouver, Toronto (Scarborough RT). How does a company with so much expertise in what they do fail if the Edmonton audit is correct in putting blame on Thales and missing deadlines?
Also, the City reported at one point that the Metro line was $90 million under budget. Is that still true or has the majority of that been either reallocated to the Valley Line or spent on the subsequent mess and audit that has come up since?
Regardless of pricing, or promises to meet an agreed upon deadline, was the decision even made to introduce a new “system” requiring advanced and complex interfacing with the already old, perhaps outdated, existing system? THAT right there is failure waiting to happen. Especially, from what I have read and understand, when GE was in the running for the project and who provided the existing system. At least you are introducing an upgraded system that would most likely require some backwards compatible interfacing.
Division of the project into signalling and civil components – whoever concocted than should be demoted to renovating public outhouse facilities. Let’s purposefully separate the right hand from the left hand on such a major project. Unbelievable.
You state “In my mind, this report will not slow or tarnish City Council’s pursuit of a full LRT network for Edmonton.” Damage is done. And I am concerned over the long-term viability and life of this project. Thank God it’s not going over the river, but I am concerned part of this line IS underground. When monkeys were responsible for running the show, there are going to be banana peels all over the place. I truly hope I am wrong.
So until the next transportation SNAFU (after the Metro Line, 102 Street bridge, and Walterdale Bridge) that irks you as well as the citizens of this great city Mayor Iveson, keep up YOUR great work!
Thales is a multi-international company with a high success rate for installing signaling in other major cities.Thales’ allegation that Thales has been misrepresented in City reports, and misinformation released by the City on the Metro Line LRT issues does not seem to be addressed in the Mayor’s thoughts,nor was there any acknowledgement for Thales international successes on similar projects..
The Mayor’s thoughts on the City’s role are pointed, appreciated, and he is (will be) taking responsible City staff to task for future failures. He could have gone further.
Regardless, I feel to restore public confidence the Mayor and Council has to publicly hold City staff accountable for the past failures of the Metro Line contract .
If action has been taken, the Mayor should explain who was held accountable and what was the extent of the action taken for these past mismanagement. Otherwise, the public will rightfully feel that the Mayor and Council are soft on mismanagement of public money and contracts.
This ‘ boondoggle’ has far reaching consequences. Edmonton’s reputation for managing infrastructure projects is now open to intense scrutiny.
All projects are now tainted by the management failure of the Metro Line. Setting the stage to correctly question Edmonton’s managerial capacity, in tri-party funded infrastructure projects.
There’s now a trust and confidence deficit, the city has to over come, on the Valley Line and in a larger context, the entire LRT build out.
Details on the Valley Line P3 are in short supply. City administration, council, and Mayor Iveson have not explained, how a private company will integrate its bottom line focused service into a public service.
In order to get Federal Funding for the Valley Line, the Harper Government foisted the P3, design build operate concept on Edmonton. That caveat is unique to Edmonton.
Essentially, by rigging the funding model, the federal government has turned Edmonton’s Valley line LRT into a private monopoly. There has been little public discussion, on just how that will work, and what and how benefits will accrue to Edmontonians.
It’s worth watching, closely, the Mayor, Council and the Administration to see if the lessons of the Metro Line will lead to an more open, authentic, transparent, financially acute, and community beneficial Valley Line, under a private monopoly, running a public service.
Your Worship,
You are to be commended for acknowledging that you preside over an Administration long known for a “NO SUPERVISION” mind set in respect of Capital Works Projects.
Published in a local Newspaper today, is the result of a poll taken of the citizenry, with the sole question being: Should the City fire anyone for the LRT mismanagement just revealed by the Auditor.
94% of those responding answered in the affirmative.
Your Worship, do this and your legacy will have had a head start.
HJS.
What kind of compensation was on the contract for late delivery. If the city agreed to pay extra for a tight timeline, then even once the system is fully operational, it seems that we should be able to hold back whatever premium we’re paying over the lowest bidder.
It appears that City Council takes no responsibility for any of this. It seems like council just let the transportation department do what they wanted, with little or no oversight from elected officials. Who, really, has been asleep at the LRT switch?
That being said, it seems like action is being taken, and perhaps council does have enough backbone to get this sorted out, although WHEN seems to be the bigger question. Best of Luck Mayor! Maybe you can pass a bylaw to fix it, you do make the law, right?
I think management’s accountability extends further than ensuring the recommendations are implemented. There need to be consequences for what has happened. The number of major problems with infrastructure projects indicates that there are systemic issues in the city administration. The city manager ultimately has to take responsibility for this. People cannot expect to hold high-paying, senior-level jobs without having to accept consequences for mistakes, even if they did not personally make them.
The city does not escape responsibility by contracting out work. Pointing the finger at Thales does not solve anything. I can’t help but suspect that a factor in the ongoing delays is the desire to protect the city’s position in litigation, which is unacceptable.
I am disgusted by the flow of misinformation from Corporate Communications over the last four years insisting that “the project is well managed” and implying that citizens who complain are immature. I suggest that the City follow the provincial government’s example by abolishing that department and making each operational department responsible and accountable for its own communications. The objective of city communication should be transparency, not spin control.
A lot of focus has been on THALES and the safety concerning the signalling system. But I find the following comment interesting.
“The consultant is described as having approved the Thales system suitable for training but no passenger operation. One can wonder why the Thales system [is] safe enough for the train drivers, but not the travelling public, and why NO signal protection is better for the public than the level of protection afforded the train operators during training.”
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/metro-lrt-mess-could-be-headed-for-courts-councillors-say-1.3196254
Another interesting point is that the city is not addressing the shoddy workmanship of the Metro LRT line. Why is that? Why are tax payers paying for a sub par product? Is it because the same construction company is bidding on building the Valley LRT Line? Why would we want the same construction company to build the Valley Line when they can not be trusted to properly build the Metro Line?
http://www.edmontonjournal.com/NAIT+line+construction+problems+much+deeper+than+signal+system+leaked+report+shows/11191572/story.html
http://www.edmontonjournal.com/opinion/Infographic+construction+problems+with+NAIT+line+electrical/11189878/story.html
And yet, through all of this, City Council still trusts Transportation’s judgement on the best route for the LRT bridge. Save The Footbridge! Send the Valley Line along the Low Level corridor – and daylight Mill Creek.
In my own experience a company as large as Thales may be professional and high performance in one region and not so in another. When you get any group of human beings that large there is bound to be diversity in every facet of who they are and what they do.
University LRT started in 92 and since that we haven’t added even one stop a year!
We also manage to find new ways to slow that down!